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ictators do not simply come and go. And when they go, they rarely go quietly. The test 
of a dictator like President Erdoğan isn't how he came to power but how he treats 
critics, journalists, minorities, and whether he can still be outvoted. Now that a narrow 
majority of Turkish voters in the referendum has supported the codification of autocracy, any 
hope for the democratic removal of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has evaporated. Given this sorry 
state of affairs, the EU has no other choice but to terminate Turkey’s accession process. By 
constitutionalising an executive presidential system that erases the separation of powers and 
frees Erdoğan’s hands to deepen repression, Turkey will be in breach of the ‘political’ criteria 
for EU membership for years, if not decades, to come.1  
Rather than merely ‘suspending’ accession negotiations in an attempt to keep up appearances 
– bureaucratic language that will be lost on Erdoğan as much as it will be on liberal Turks and 
European citizens – the EU should stand behind its core values and reset its relationship with 
the Republic of Turkey on a more credible and strategic footing, while pressing the regime on 
respect for human rights and working with civil society to keep the flame of ‘deep’ democracy 
alive. 
Action, reaction? 
Thus far, the EU institutions and the Turkish authorities have engaged in a game of ‘chicken’, 
gambling on which side will be the first to pull the plug on Turkey’s accession process. After the 
Venice Commission’s sharp condemnation of the proposed amendments to Turkey’s 
constitution and the curbs on media freedom in the country, High Representative Federica 
Mogherini and European Commissioner Johannes Hahn issued a carefully worded statement in 
                                               
1 For an anatomy of the constitutional changes, see S. Blockmans and S. Yilmaz, “Turkey and the Codification of 
Autocracy”, CEPS Policy Insights, March 2017.  
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which they expressed their concerns about, among others, the excessive concentration of 
powers around the presidency, which would have a serious impact on the necessary checks 
and balances. Nevertheless, they deferred the final assessment until after the referendum and 
said that they would evaluate  
the proposed amendments (…) and especially their practical implementations (…) in light 
of Turkey’s obligations as an EU candidate country and as a member of the Council of 
Europe. 
In other words, the EU is unwilling to act on the constitutional changes alone but will reconsider 
its assessment only when their “practical implementations” become too grave to ignore. 
At the end of referendum day on April 16th, the pair – now joined by Commission President 
Jean-Claude Juncker, was quick to re-issue the statement, in an effort to buy more time: 
We are awaiting the assessment of the OSCE/ODIHR International Observation Mission, 
also with regard to alleged irregularities. (…) We encourage Turkey to address the Council 
of Europe's concerns and recommendations, including with regards to the State of 
Emergency. In view of the close referendum result and the far-reaching implications of the 
constitutional amendments, we also call on the Turkish authorities to seek the broadest 
possible national consensus in their implementation. 
In a preliminary report published less than 24 hours later, the OSCE and the Council of Europe 
said that the vote had been held “on an unlevel playing field,” a reference to a state of 
emergency imposed by Erdoğan’s government in the wake of the failed military coup of July 
2016. Under the state of emergency, deputies from one of the main opposition parties were 
among the thousands of people arrested, ‘no’ campaigners were physically intimidated and 
their rallies and access to public media were suppressed. 
The EU should draw its own conclusions, rather than try to avoid aggravating an autocrat for 
stating the obvious. Similarly, the EU should enforce its own rules on membership and 
terminate accession negotiations, rather than try to limit political damage by taking a softer 
approach. By deferring to the judgment of other international organisations, or by waiting for 
Erdoğan to make good on his campaign bluster to organise a ‘Trexit’ referendum, or another 
on the reintroduction of the death penalty, the EU is ducking responsibility and losing 
credibility. It need not wait for the “practical implementations” of the constitutional 
amendments to find that Erdoğan’s Turkey has crossed multiple red lines.  
Since the start of the purge last summer, Turkey has been in blatant breach of democratic 
principles and fundamental rights, which form the backbone of the Copenhagen criteria. The 
Commission should not cower under political pressure from member states but assume its role 
as guardian of the treaties. Members of the European Parliament should live up to the 
democratic principles they represent. The Commission and the Parliament should recommend 
that the Council ‘terminate’ accession negotiations with Turkey. The General Affairs Council at 
the end of April provides an opportunity to formalise that decision and to discuss the desired 
breadth and depth of the future bilateral relationship. The European Council could then adopt 
guidelines for a strategic agenda for EU-Turkey relations in June.  
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Partnership not membership 
There are several reasons to prefer a strict approach to a half-hearted suspension of talks. First, 
it is evident that after more than ten years of trying, accession negotiations have failed and 
Turkey has gone in the opposite direction of EU membership. The country’s regression in 
complying with the Copenhagen criteria has been well documented by the Commission in 
successive annual reports. The latest amendments to the constitution represent the lowest 
point in the long descent into autocracy.  
Keeping up appearances in a dysfunctional accession process undermines the EU’s image as a 
soft power and as a beacon of democracy and rule of law. To be fair, the EU’s image has lost 
some of its shine in the past few years as a result of illiberal tendencies in member states like 
Hungary and Poland. Whilst working to remedy that situation internally, the EU should uphold 
the same core values and principles that underpin its policies externally. By terminating 
accession talks with Turkey, the EU would make it clear that the ‘political’ criteria for 
membership, as agreed at the 1993 summit of the European Council in Copenhagen, constitute 
the irrefutable DNA of the EU rather than simple boxes to be ticked on a negotiable checklist. 
Second, by terminating accession talks with Turkey, the EU would set an important precedent 
in showing that the pre-accession track is not a one-way street to guaranteed membership. 
This move should have a disciplining effect on other pre-accession countries in southeast 
Europe where popular support for EU membership remains high, but compliance with EU 
demands by the authorities has lagged behind. It would raise the stakes in Macedonia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the debilitating obstruction by unaccountable politicians of state 
institutions and the clash between Russian and neo-Ottoman influences should be decided in 
the EU’s favour. The effect on Serbia might be harder to gauge, given that it is the only country 
in the region where support for EU membership has dropped below 50%. But the EU should be 
consistent in its approach and not undermine the credibility of the enlargement policy. It should 
also work harder to make good on the promise made back in 2003 to integrate the Western 
Balkans. 
Re-entry into the EU 
Third, Turkey remains a ‘European’ country with a capacity to trigger Article 49 TEU; it could 
therefore reapply for EU membership if and when it is ready to accept the rules of the club. 
Even if starting the process from scratch is more cumbersome than a resumption of talks, a 
mid- to longer-term suspension would anyway have to be followed by a wholesale screening of 
compliance with membership conditions and pre-accession benchmarks, and possibly the 
renegotiation of the latter.  
Moreover, any decision by the EU to suspend talks would in any case be sold as ‘termination’ 
by President Erdoğan to audiences at home. While it is true that cancelling accession 
negotiations would relieve the regime of any pretence at democratisation, it ought not to kill 
the incentive for reform that remains in Turkish society, particularly in the big cities in the west 
of the country. On the contrary: it may reinforce it. If the EU is seen to get tough with the 
regime, while supporting any remaining political opposition, human rights defenders and civil 
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society organisations in and outside of the country, it will prove itself to be a more effective 
antidote to the authoritarian rule of President Erdoğan. This support would also speak to the 
frustration felt by many Turks at the EU’s unprincipled attitude towards the great leader. 
Proponents of suspending accession talks systematically exaggerate the impact of nuanced 
bureaucratic language and underestimate the potential damage of giving false hope to those 
they claim to protect. The risk of further autocratic behaviour and instability in Turkey is real, 
irrespective of the EU’s decision to suspend or terminate accession talks. Boosted by the victory 
in the referendum on April 16th, Erdoğan has again floated the idea of organising a referendum 
on the reintroduction of the death penalty – testing the EU’s knee-jerk reaction. More 
dangerously, he has effectively imported the war in Syria to the southeast of Turkey, fanning 
the flames of both homegrown and international terrorism. These and other tendencies will 
continue to play out according to their own domestic logic and regional dynamics. 
Finally, the EU should emancipate itself from the humiliating and reprehensible migration deal 
with Turkey. Leaders of key member states and EU institutions continue to defend the EU-
Turkey Statement of March 2016 as a game changer in dealing with the refugee and migration 
crisis. Ahead of national elections in France, Germany and other EU member states, they have 
been bending over backwards to emphasise the importance of Turkey sticking to a deal that 
rights groups have exposed as a humanitarian disaster, thereby downplaying the flanking 
measures (e.g. closing the Balkan route) that have been just as important in ‘stopping the flow’. 
Relishing his position as kingmaker and arch scaremonger, Erdoğan has directly or indirectly 
threatened to suspend the agreement and allow 15,000 refugees to make their way to Europe 
every month. Just as it was unwilling to be blackmailed by the same tactics of Libya’s Colonel 
Gaddafi, the EU should not allow itself to be held hostage by Mr Erdoğan. The migration deal is 
inherently flawed, for moral, political and humanitarian reasons, and parts of it have become 
unviable, particularly “the commitment to re-energise the accession process”. The EU-Turkey 
Statement should therefore be revisited, sooner rather than later.  
Any attempt to defuse this time bomb during the campaign for the German federal elections 
might be tricky in terms of potential fall-out among supporters of both Chancellor Merkel and 
President Erdoğan in Germany. But it may also prove necessary to limit the damage if Erdoğan 
does indeed ‘open the floodgates’. If handled properly, political parties in Germany could be 
rewarded with electoral gains, but only if it is underpinned by a principled position on the 
termination of accession talks. What is clear is that neither Germany nor the EU should remain 
in this vulnerable position vis-à-vis a dictatorial regime in Ankara, because it could destabilise 
Europe more than the defenders of the migration deal appear to believe. 
Incidentally, visa-free travel for Turkish citizens should be treated independently and remain 
high on the agenda of a strategic partnership. If Turkey is willing to comply with the conditions 
for visa liberalisation, then the EU should be ready to extend that right. 
In the spirit of ‘principled pragmatism’ that emanates from its 2016 global strategy, the EU 
should uphold its core values and take the opportunity to refashion a strategic partnership with 
Turkey around a number of issues that are of mutual interest, and which in fact have already 
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become ‘escape routes’ from the pre-accession process. These issues are: migration and the 
free movement of people, counter-terrorism and regional security, energy and the 
modernisation of the customs union. Such a transactional arrangement would inject a much-
needed dose of realism into the flailing relationship. But it should be clear to Erdoğan that, as 
part of such a transactional approach, any future bilateral cooperation should go hand in hand 
with a reinvigorated human rights dialogue and continued EU support for civil society.  
The EU must not abandon the half of the Turkish population that did not vote for the 
codification of autocracy. 
